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ABSTRACT 
Various methods of systematic analys have been devised to 
help Resource Managers make decisions. Occasionally, in 
the past, these methods have not been used in an objective 
manner as they have played an advocacy role in the decision-
making process. The recent reform of the Government Land 
Management agencies will have an effect on the way these 
methods are used. 
This reform resulted in the creation of agencies with 
more specific functions. also increased the possibility 
of unresolved conflict between the agencies over how Crown 
land should be used. 
This conflict will be difficult to resolve due to the 
relative inflexibility of these new agencies. It is likely 
that methods of systematic analysis will be used to influence 
decision-makers and the public into believing that certain 
outcomes are more desirable than others. These analyses 
will most probably be biased either consciously or 
unconsciously. The Cora Lynn Proposal would seem to 
confirm the occurrence of this behaviour. 
It cannot be expected that an analysis can ever be 
totally unbiased. However, the institutional environment 
can be adjusted so as minimise the effect of this bias, 
and to make any b that 
parties involved in the 
There is a need 
explicit to the various 
1. A non-partisan land management organisation to carry 
out the evaluation. 
2. Public participation and involvement throughout the 
evaluation procedure, thereby ensuring that the 
assumptions used are explicit to all. 
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CHAPTER ONE;INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Problem 
It is generally accepted that the aim of 'good' resource 
management is the achievement of an integrated approach to 
environmental management. An integrated approach means that 
the whole system is considered; both the natural 
environment's potential and constraints are matched against 
society's demands and in some way a balanced policy of 
resource use is achieved (0'Riordan,1971). 
A central factor in any resource management problem is 
the way in which the conflicts over differing types of 
resource use are resolved. For any sort of integrated 
approach to be achieved, it is necessary for some sort of 
compromise to occur between the various resource users, but 
very often compromise is difficult to achieve, as different 
resource uses are mutually exclusive ie., cannot occur at the 
same place at the same time (0 'Riordan, 1971). 
Achieving compromise is further complicated by the 
values and perception held by the various resource users. 
Each party believes that they have the 'best' programme for 
resource use and often cannot place any real value upon the 
alternatives. 
Therefore, achieving some sort of compromise between 
potential resource users is difficult at the best of times, 
but it can be further complicated by the institutional 
environment in which these conflicts are occurring (Ostrom, 
1986). 
At present New Zealand's institutional structure which 
admini resource allocation on Crown land would seem to 
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be orientated towards a separation of resource uses, 
especially between the consumptive resource uses and the non-
consumptive uses. This separation would seem to make an 
integrated approach to resource management difficult because 
it encourages conflict between consumptive resource users and 
those who wish to preserve those resources. One of the more 
important aspects of this new institutional arrangement will 
be the nature of the con ict between these institutions as 
they now have no onus upon them to compromise on important 
issues. 
1.2 Political context 
The present environ~ental management institutions resulted 
from the 1987 reform instigated by the fourth Labour 
Government. 
A prominent feature of the reform was the abolition of 
two of the largest government departments: The New Zealand 
Forest Service and the Department of Lands and Survey. From 
these two agencies arose six new entities; two state-owned 
enterprises, three government departments and the office of 
Parliamentary Commissioner of the Environment (Gregory, 1987) . 
All of these new entities were given more specific goals 
with the emphas on separating the commercial and non-
commercial functions. 
The reform itself was largely motivated by the desire to 
improve the efficiency and accountability of the Public 
Service (Boston,1987). It was believed that this could be 
achieved by giving the agencies clearer and non-conflicting 
goals (TreasurYt 1984). 
One of the foreseen results of this separation of 
functions between agencies advocating development and the 
agency with the responsibility for advocating conservation 
would be that conflicts over resource use issues would now 
exist between agencies, rather than being resolved quietly 
within a single agency_ In this way, these issues would be 
more open to scrutiny from the Government and the public. 
It was hoped that this scrutiny would increase the 
accountability for any decisions made. 
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It has been noted that given the more single purpose, 
single minded directives of these agencies, and also given 
the current dependence on adversarial resolution methods, 
these conflicts will be more difficult to resolve 
(Hayward,1987). The resolution of conflict by adversarial 
methods rely on a supposedly impartial adjudicator who 
determines who is right based upon the 'facts' of the case, 
but this method when used in environmental conflicts has come 
under criticism (Taplin,1986). 
1.3 The Cora Lynn Forestry Project 
An example of conflict between the new Government entities is 
already occurring at Cora Lynn in the Canterbury High 
Country. 
This project involves the proposed development of a 
forest woodlot on Crown pastoral leasehold land. This land 
which has potential for forestry is seen by others as having 
important values for conservation(Belton,1987aiForsyth,1987). 
Three Government agencies are involved in this conflict 
which has in project being stalled while both 
sides await adjudication by a Cabinet Committee (M. Belton, 
pers comm/1988). 
1.4 The Role of Systematic Analysis in Resource Management 
Conflicts 
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An important aspect of resource management conflicts is the 
way in which various systematic analysis techniques have been 
used in the resolution of those conflicts. 
Due to the complexity of the issues involved in resource 
management, various analytical methods have been developed to 
help assess the complex array of technical, economic, social, 
political, and legal implications of policy (O'Riordan,1971). 
These methods attempt to systematically quantify the 
benefits and the costs of alternative resource use 
combinations in relation to some specified desired goal or 
goals. 
In the past, resources and resource use were treated as 
being largely independent from other resource use. Few if 
any, allocative devices such as cost-benefit analysis were 
used, but this changed with the realisation that resources 
were interlinked and that one resource use often impinged 
detrimentally upon other uses. It was also realised that 
there was a possibility of resource scarcity. 
These two factors lead to the realisation that there was 
a need to devise some procedures whereby widely differing 
resource programmes could be compared and analysed. 
Generally the means of comparing these alternatives was based 
on concepts of economic efficiency and technical feasibility 
(O'Riordan,1971) . 
All of the methods that have so far been devised have 
one crucial limitation. This limitation is that in the 
designing or selection of an analytical method, there is a 
requirement that values be used. These values are not 
scientific as they must often be drawn from other sources 
(MacAllister, 1980) . 
These methods while apparently being objective are in 
fact based upon values and require value judgements in their 
application (Self,1975; Paris and Reynolds(1983). 
As a result of these subjective elements, these 
analytical methods have often been used in the past as a 
means of advocacy (Self,1975; Hanke and Williams(1983). 
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It may be expected that in an institutional environment 
where conflict occurs in a public forum, or before an 
adjudicator looking for the 'facts' of the issue, the results 
of apparently objective analyses will be presented by the 
various parties involved in the conflict. Although, it 
appears objective and scientific, it might well be expected 
that these results may be based upon distorted or even biased 
analysis and are being used as a method of advocating a 
certain outcome in the conflict. 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether particular 
analytical methods are being used to justify or promote 
courses of action which are favourable to those agencies 
undertaking the analysis, and then to discuss the 
implications of behaviour to resource managemente 
1. To outline the common types of systematic analysis 
and discuss their use in the past with particular reference 
to cost-benefit analysis. 
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2. To examine the role of systematic evaluation in a 
pre-reform environmental institution so a comparison of their 
use in the current institutional arrangements can be made. 
3. To describe the new institutional arrangements so as 
to assess the role of systematic analysis in the allocation, 
use and administration of Crown land. 
4. To analyse the Cora Lynn project to detect whether 
analytical methods are performing an advocacy role in the 
political process. 
5. To make recommendations about the use of systematic 
analysis in respect to resource management. 
1.6 Outline 
Chapter two defines the term systematic analysis. There is 
a discussion of why adversarial procedures are so prevalent 
in environmental conflicts and why systematic analysis has 
been so important in them. 
Chapter three discusses why multiple-use agencies came 
into existence so as to describe the social forces that 
formed them and to give a better understanding of their 
behaviour. The New Zealand Forest Service is used as an 
example of such an organisation. This is done to 
determine how decision-making was undertaken in such an 
organisation and what role if any, systematic analys had in 
this process. 
Chapter four discusses the rationale behind the reform 
of the environmental administration which occurred in 1987 
It then analyses what the probable relationships between the 
new agencies will be and the resulting effect this will have 
on the use or misuse of systmatic analysis. 
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Chapter five uses the confl arising over the proposed 
forestry woodlot at Cora Lynn in the Canterbury High Country 
as a case study. The developments of this situation are 
analysed to determine whether the expected behaviour of the 
various agencies has begun to occur. As a major part of 
this chapter, an analysis will be done of any evaluation 
methods used. 
Chapter six is a discussion of the way these analytical 
methods were used before the reform and the way they seem to 
be used at present in this case for the Cora Lynn project. 
Finally, the relevance this new behaviour in the context 
of resource management will be discussed and recommendations 
made. 
CHAPTER TWO: SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS AND THE 
ADVERSARIAL PROCESS 
2.1 Introduction 
The point that resource management is a very complex 
phenomenon has already been mentioned in chapter one. Even 
if a clear statement of goals available, the problems of 
resource allocation are by no means solved. 
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At the core of resource management process, there are 
the basic issues of how much of the resource should be used, 
when to use it, where the use is most demanded, what quality 
of use is desired, who desires it (or who does not desire it) 
and so on. This process involves assessment as to quantity, 
quality, space, and time, not only with regard to the actual 
employment of resources, but also with consideration of 
repercussive side effects of the socio-biophysical 
environment (O'Riordan,1971:22). The goal of these 
assessment procedures is to be able to evaluate a proposed 
project in a rigorous (thorough) or systematic fashion 
(O'Riordan,1971:22). 
Some of the most common systematic analytical methods 
are briefly described in this chapter. This list is not an 
extensive one and is merely here to give an idea of what is 
meant by the use of the term systematic analysis. This 
section is followed by a discussion of why adversarial 
conflict resolution procedures are so often used during 
environmental issues. Their limitations in such situations 
are also discussed. Then, there is a discussion of why 
systematic analytical methods are frequently introduced into 
adversarial proceedings and the that they play. 
The chapter finishes with a brief discussion of a 
systematic analytical techniques that have been used in 
adversarial proceedings in the past. 
2.2 Common Methods of Systematic Analysis 
Cost-benefit analysis was the first analytical method used 
extensively environment assessment (O'Riordan,1971). It 
attempts to use a systematic rating procedure to calculate 
the composite impacts of a project (MacAllister,1980). 
Cost-benefit analysis can either be extended to incorporate 
social costs and benefits, or it can be limited to measuring 
only those costs and benefits that are already measured in 
monetary terms; (construction, Labour, operation and 
Maintenance). This limited version is known as cost-
effectiveness accounting. Even though, cost-effectiveness 
accounting would appear to be the easiest part of cost-
benefit analysis, costs in the past have proven to be 
difficult to accurately determine, partly because of price 
uncertainties and partly due to poor execution of the 
analysis (O'Riordan,1971). 
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Cost-benefit analysis expressed many weaknesses. These 
weaknesses could be categorised into two types. The first 
was the philosphical problem of using an assessment method 
based upon economic values. The second category consisted 
of the many types of empirical problems which centred on the 
difficulty of measuring things in monetary terms when often 
these had no market value ego human life, virgin wilderness, 
and then the problem of making these values commensurate with 
other values ( & Reynolds, 1983). 
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Goals-achievement matrix is a method that developed out 
of cost-benefit analysis in an attempt to overcome some of 
these weaknesses. The procedure involves comparing the 
relative importance of groups of alternatives, which are 
weighted according to various community goals. This method 
did not solve the problems of commensurate values but did 
attempt to deal with the concepts of multiple goals and 
multiple strategies (MacAllister,1980). 
The next stage occurred with the development of high 
speed computers. This allowed the development of 
sophisticated mathematical methods and the use of systems 
analysis as a means of assessing alternative courses of 
action (MacAllister, 1980). The two main methods in this 
category are linear programming and goal programming. 
simply explained, these define the systems' relationships and 
system constraints mathematically. The computer then 
proceeds to trade off these relationships until an optimum 
answer is achieved in respect to some objective. 
Unfortunately the same evaluation problems present in cost 
benefit analysis are still present in these methods 
(O'Riordan,1971) . 
These problems all centred on the subjective element 
that is required when making the many assumptions needed to 
undertake an analysis. Assumptions about what method should 
be used, what should be measured, and how should it be 
measured? (MacAllister,1980). 
Therefore, these methods were designed to be systematic, 
rigorous methods of assessments so as to reduce the 
sUbjective component in ion-making,but the result was 
that the decisions only appeared to be more objective 
than decisions made 
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an informal, non-systematic way (Paris 
& Reynolds 1983; Self,1975). 
2.3 Resolution of Environmental Conflict 
Types of Conflict Resolution 
The two main types of conflict resoltuion that exist are the 
mediation and adversarial processes. 
In New Zealand these two methods are used in both public 
forums and in cases of conflict that occur in more closed 
arenas; such as in conflicts between government agencies. 
Mediation is the process where a mediator brings parties 
together so that some agreement can be reached. The 
mediator acts as a conduit, ensuring that messages between 
the conflicting parties are not distorted. It is essential 
that the mediator is impartial so as to be able to construct 
outcomes acceptable to both parties (Moon,1979). 
The second type of procedure is the adversarial process 
based on the judicial method. Here, the settlement of the 
disagreement requires the intervention of a third party; a 
Judge, who ascertains the true facts, selects the relevant 
norm and decides which party is to prevail (Moon, 1979) . 
The adversarial process can occur in the traditional 
situation which is the court, but often it occurs where a 
person or group has some authority to impose a decision. In 
the case of the Cora Lynn project this role has been taken by 
a Cabinet Committee. 
Both methods have their limitations and these are 
especially highlighted in case on environmental disputes. 
It generally agreed there are two types of 
conflict: conflict of interest (competition); and conflict 
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of values (dissensus). Conflict of interest occurs where 
two part want the same thing but there is not enough to go 
around. 
A conflict of values occurs where two parties disagree 
over the normative status of a social object and/or factual 
matters (Moon,1979). In real conflicts there is always a 
mixture of these two types, but in environmental disputes, 
there is almost always a strong conflict of values. 
In situations such as this, mediation is limited in what 
it can achieve, as solutions have to result through 
bargaining and compromise and on the condition that there is 
something to give and something to take on both sides 
(Moon,1979). Therefore, mediation though often a more 
productive process is rarely effective in cases of 
environmental conflict where usually neither one of the 
parties is prepared to give an inch (D. Jackson per 
comrn,1988) . 
When mediation fails in environmental disputes, often 
the only recourse is to use adversarial procedures. The 
adversarial approach has its limitations too. Although 
there is resolution of the conflict, that resolution is often 
based on a norm determined by the adjudicator. This norm 
may not be the norm that reflects the norms of society. 
Another problem is that often in the case of 
environmental conflict, the issues involved are complex and 
technical. The adjudicator often cannot understand all of 
the implications of the evidence presented. When this 
occurs the adjudicator is often forced to rely on personal 
biases or upon the ion made during the presentation of 
that evidence (Taplin, 1986) 
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The most important drawback to the adversarial process 
when considered in the light of resource management is that 
it is a zero-sum result (Moon,1979). One party wins and the 
other party loses irrespective of the validity of that 
party's stand. Any attempt to integrate the various 
proposed resource use options cannot be achieved through this 
process. 
The Role of Empirical Evidence in the Adversarial Process 
The main characteristic of adversarial proceedings involves 
opposing antagonistic parties or interests. One party with 
witnesses striving to prove facts essential to his/her case 
and the other party striving to prove other facts and to 
disprove the opposition's facts. The decision is made by 
one or more adjudicators (Taplin, 1986). 
As the adjudicator is supposedly impartial, he or she 
can only be swayed by the facts (Moon,1979). Therefore, 
evidence presented must be or at least appear to be rational. 
The importance of the rational ideology in this situation 
becomes clear because this rational outlook acknowledges that 
there should be empirical evidence for factual claims and 
because empirically supported policy generalisations are 
likely to be more effective than those without such a warrant 
(Paris & Reynold, 1983:213). 
It can be expected that when environmental issues are 
brought to adjudication, there is a greater likelihood of 
systematic empirical methods being used to support arguments 
(D. Jackson per comm.,1988). 
2.4 Cost Benefit Analysis as an example of Advocacy 
'rhe oldest and most used form of evaluation in resource 
management is cost-benefit analysis (O'Riordan,1971). 
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It is based on the premise that all inputs and outputs can be 
measured in monetary terms and thereby made commensurable 
(Williams,1983). In this way, the sum of the benefits 
(monetized value of the beneficial impacts) can be compared 
to the sum of the costs (monetized values of the negative 
impacts) . If the benefits outweigh the costs then using 
this method, the proposed action should be adopted 
(MacAllister, 1980). 
There are many criticisms of this method and these are 
beyond the scope of this work, see for example Self (1975). 
Central to the use of cost-benefit analysis as a method 
of helping resolve allocation conflicts is the importance of 
the concept of "rationality", in that rational behaviour in 
decision-making is where alternative courses of action are 
systematically examined and weighed to find the most 
efficient means to achieve a given end (Paris & 
Reynold,1983:209). 
Cost-benefit analysis is seen as an objective means of 
ranking alternatives and that the "objective interests" of 
rationality guiding the formulation and use of cost benefit 
analysis are separate from the political interests attached 
to the "subjective" views of the participants in a policy 
dispute (Zinke, 1987:67). 
By appearing to be neutral, cost-benefit analysis 
legitimates the position it advocates. In this way, it is 
hoped that conflict will reduced because c zens 11 see 
the "objective reality" of the decision. In doing so, it 
relies on the aura that surrounds scientific methodology 
(Zinke,1987:67). 
Often cost-benefit analysis is not neutral as it is 
based on assumptions about prices, discount rates and even 
about which benefits and costs should be included in the 
analysis (Self,1975). 
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Therefore, the supposed objectivity of the method 
becomes questionable when the assumptions the analysis is 
based on are formed from the values of the analyst (Paris & 
Reynold, 1983) • For cost-benefit analysis to be a reasonably 
"hard, value-free science" it needs to be conducted in an 
explicit manner, so that the results can be replicable 
(Williams,1983). This is rarely done. 
Cost-benefit analysis has been used extensively in both 
the United states and the United Kingdom. It has come under 
considerable criticism in both countries resulting in it 
losing considerable credibility as a decision-making tool. 
For further reading refer to Zinke (1987); Hanke and Williams 
(1983); and Self (1975). 
2.5 Conclusion 
Although, various methods of systematic analysis have been 
devised, they are all subject to the problem of needing 
subjective values to be incorporated into the analysis. 
They do have the appearance of being scientific, and at face 
value appear to be 'value-free'. 
case. 
This assumption is not the 
The importance of these methods in advocacy is this 
appearance of rationality and this becomes extremely 
important in the situation where conflicts are being resolved 
through an adversarial process. 
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The nature of the issues in 
resource management conflicts ensures that the only method of 
resolving them is through the adversarial process. 
An adjudicator who is caught in a conflict of values is 
also required to be objective. Often, the adjudicator will 
be swayed by values that are packaged in a way that appears 
to be objective and 'value-free'. 
This situation has occurred in both the united states and 
Britain, but upon finding that the use of these methods has 
been less than objective, these methods have fallen into 
disrepute. 
CHAPTER THREE: SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS AND 
THE MULTIPLE-USE AGENCY 
3.1 The origin of Multiple-Use Agencies 
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Over the last century, and more specifically, in the last 
thirty years, our perceptions of our relationship with the 
environment have changed. This has occurred in conjunction 
with an increased understanding of the effect of society's 
use and misuse of resources (O'Riordan,1971). 
with the realisation that resources were not 
superabundant carne the realisation that there was a need for 
conservation. At the same time the concept of what a 
resource is, has also changed. A resource can now be 
defined as not only something to be used but also something 
that is used by society but is not diminished. These 
resources have been described as amenity resources which 
involve issues affecting "environmental quality" (o'Riordan, 
1971:15) . 
A balance between conservation and development was 
desired by society. This desire can be seen in the 
development of planning legislation in New Zealand in the 
last twenty years. For instance, the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1977, which included terms such as 'wise use of 
land' • 
In New Zealand the initial moves towards towards the 
goal of integrated management of conservation and development 
took place in a background of a national economic policy 
based on Government interventionism. Policy was formulated 
for implementation by large, multiple-objective agencies 
(O'Connor & Swaffeild / 1987). 
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There were two multiple objective agencies: The 
Department of Lands & Survey and the New Zealand Forest 
Service. They have adapted in the last twenty years to meet 
the changing conditions of resources and resource use, and 
the changing values and aspirations of society (o'Connor & 
Swaffield, 1987). 
It was the Forest Service that made a greater attempt of 
integrating production and conservation values and it also 
suffered the most criticism for doing so. Most of this 
criticism revolved around issues of how decisions concerning 
the balancing of resource use were made. 
3.2 The New Zealand Forest Service 
conflicting Objectives 
Though the New Zealand Forest Service had been managing for 
multiple values since its foundation, it was a predominantly 
a timber producing agency ensuring a supply of timber for the 
nation (Trotman & Thomson, 1988a). 
In 1976, an amendment to the Forest Act had the effect 
of formalising the Forest Service into a multiple-use forest 
management agency. The amendment provided for the balanced 
use of state forest land by removing the words "not 
prejudicial to forestry". The amendment had the effect of 
making all the listed objectives in the amendment equal in 
value. These objectives ranged from timber production 
through to recreation and conservation (Trotman & Thomson, 
1988b) . 
Many of these functions were in conflict. The 
amendment did not how conflict could 
how to achieve balanced use. 
or 
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The New Zealand Forest Service catered to client groups 
ranging from timber millers through to conservationists. 
Each of these groups perceived the meaning of balanced use in 
different ways. This imposed considerable pressure on the 
Forest Service but at the same time this ambiguity of 
objectives allowed the Forest Service considerable discretion 
in the way they utilised their resources (Halkett, 1987). 
How can ambiguous objectives permit discretion? By 
having a lack of clear priorities the Forest Service could 
justify its actions by placing different emphasis and weight 
to the various objectives. It could, for example, justify 
the felling of indigenous timber, thought by some as in need 
of protection, by saying that society as a whole needed the 
benefit of that timber supply_ On the other hand, it often 
responded to charges of poor financial performance by saying 
that it had functions and responsibilities that were non-
profitable as a private company (Grant,1987; Kirkland, 1988) . 
Since society as a whole could not agree to the correct 
balance of objectives, it was impossible to determine what 
the correct decision should be in any given situation. The 
Forest Service could not be held accountable since society 
could not agree on what it should be achieving 
(Treasury,1984; Halkett,1987). 
The Structure of the New Zealand Forest Service 
The 1976 amendment to the Forest Act 1949, did not reform the 
New Zealand Forest Service. Even though the Service was now 
obligated to a new set of priorities, the structure of 
the Service was reformed in any major As a result, 
the structure still reflected the more historical role of 
timber production. Of the nine divisions in the Forest 
Service, only one, the Environmental Forestry Division, was 
responsible for administering all non-commercial values. 
All of the other divisions were commercial in function or 
support facilities for the commercial divisions (Review 
committee, 1982). The minor role of the Environmental 
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Forestry Division was reinforced by the fact that only 21% of 
the annual budget was spent on non-commercial functions 
(Report of the Director-General,1987). 
The Environmental forestry Division had long been at a 
disadvantage in the decisionmaking process. It was only a 
minor voice amongst many commercially orientated divisions. 
The Conservation movement perceived that environmental 
concerns were still only a minor branch of the service (D. 
J.Round,pers comm, 1988). 
The Character of the Forest Service: Foresters and the Forest 
Service 
The development of the New Zealand Forest Service was 
modelled in part after the united States Forest service, and 
certain useful comparisons can be made. 
Kaufman (1960) evaluated the United states Organisation 
and found that the focal point of the Sevice was the 
professsional forest ranger. Both the New Zealand and the 
united states Forest Services faced a common problem; the 
need to achieve a high degree of unity amongst the large 
number of geographically dispersed and relatively isolated 
professional staff (Halkett,1987). 
Kaufman found that this unity was achieved f 
selecting limen who fit", ie., men> \",rho had a love of the 
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outdoors; men who could handle a hard job for little money_ 
Then, they were ined in such a way as to give a common 
technical and philosophical basis to forest management. 
Then, through frequent relocation, they were placed in a 
position where it was difficult to make personal attachments 
outside the service. In this way, they identified with their 
profession and with the Service, as the Service became their 
home. Often, foresters worked their entire career in the 
Service. They worked amongst other foresters and followed 
other foresters orders. Kaufman found this was a 
professional group that volUntarily conformed and had a 
willingness to perform the directives given by the 
leadership (Kaufman, 1960). 
The New Zealand Forest Sevice closely paralleled this 
situation. sixty percent of all members of the New Zealand 
Institute of Foresters worked for the Service (Olsen, 1987). 
As such the training of forest professionals in this country 
was largely geared towards the demands of the Forest Service. 
Skills that were thought relevant were taught and 
emphasised. There was also a selection process which 
prospective employees of the Service were required to 
undertake. 
There were two types of forest professionals in New 
Zealand; the forester and the forest ranger. The ranger was 
the day to day manager, he worked for the Service while being 
trained. During this training he attended block courses 
every year. The training centre he attended was staffed and 
run by the Forest Service. 
Foresters comprised of University graduates who had 
usually been bonded during their training to the 
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organisation. The candidates for this programme were 
required to work fulltime for a year in an isolated locality 
before commencing university. If the candidates were not 
suitable, they usually left during the year. In addition, 
during their studies they were also required to work every 
summer for the Service. By completion of training, these 
trainees were usually committed to the values of the Service, 
otherwise they were willing to payoff their bond and leave 
the service. 
The State Services Review Committee of the Forest 
Service was able to say that one of the major strengths of 
the Service was because; "the quality of staff at the forest 
district, and conservancy levels is one of the main factors 
which allow this policy of decentralisation of 
responsibility" (Review Committee, 1982:40). 
The Forest Service was dominated by one profession with 
one point of viewi foresters are trained to believe in the 
techniques of 'applied ecology',and the belief that the 
resource should be actively be managed for maximum sustained 
yield (Allin, 1987). 
The External Context 
Decisions were not made without regard to the external, 
political environment. Although the conservation movement 
was often the most vocal of external influences, it was the 
Government and the timber industry to which it most often 
responded (Grant,1987). 
The Forest Service was often subjected to pressure from 
politicians who in turn were responding from 
their constituents This was largely to provide 
jobs for regions 
(Hogan,1987) . 
were suffering from high unemployment 
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These employment relief schemes were of two types. The 
involved large planting schemes of Pinus radiata often 
on and with marginal forestry potential (Grant,1987). The 
second was the provision of timber, often indigenous, at 
subsidised prices (Treasury, 1984) . 
The Forest Service when criticised for economic 
performance often responded that it could not be expected to 
be economically profitable while subject to such political 
directives (Hogan, 1987) . 
The impression given by the Forest Service is that it 
did what it was told, but this would seem to be simplistic. 
has been suggested that the relationship between the 
Service and Government was a much more two way affair and 
that the Forest Service was often more than willing to obey 
directives as they concurred with their own policies 
(Grant,1987). This has not been proven in the case of the 
Forest Service, but similar situations in the area of 
electricity planning have shown that there can be a 
'coincidence of interests' between planner and politicians 
(Kellow, 1986:15) • 
The conservation movement definitely saw the Government, 
Forest Service, and Timber industry as a mutual support 
system (Grant,1987; Salmon,1984). 
3.3 Decision-making in the Forest Service 
The two aspects of conflicting objectives and 
makeup of the Service characterised the way decis 
made 
ional 
were 
This discretion and lack of accountability due to the 
ambiguous objectives allowed the forester to exercise the 
bias of their profession. Conflicts were resolved 
internally within the framework of a common ideology 
(Grant,1987). 
Any attempt by the public to participate in the 
decision- making process was either rebuffed or only used 
symbolically with sUbmissions being largely ignored 
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(Salmon, 1984) . To groups and individuals who had different 
values, the Service.and the forestry profession presented a 
united front, showing a reluctance to change methods, goals, 
or established programmes (Halkett, 1987). 
This lack of political accountability was also reflected 
in the concern that the Service was not accountable on 
economic grounds. economic performance was first 
queried by the Auditor-General's office in 1978. The 
Auditor-General questioned the financial management of the 
Forest Service and also poor financial reporting which made 
it difficult to check the Service's economic performance 
(Grant, 1987). 
Concern was also expressed by conservation interests who 
thought that clearings of indigenous forests for the planting 
of exotic species could not be justified on economic grounds, 
and by the Treasury who determined that the return on capital 
invested was not high enough to warrant the project's 
approval (Treasury, 1984:279). 
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3.4 The Use of Systematic Analysis in the New Zealand Forest 
Service 
It was in this area of financial analysis that the Forest 
Service was required to make some attempt at the use of 
systematic analysis. They were required to do a financial 
analysis of new projects to determine whether Internal Rates 
of Return (IRR) on capital invested exceeded 10%. If this 
criteria was achieved, the project would go ahead. This 
requirement was implemented by Government in 1971 (lowered to 
6% in 1986) _ The 10% rate of return was at the upper range 
of the growing rates of Pinus radiata in New Zealand and 
therefore not many locations would return such a rate 
(Grant,1987). Even during the 1970s, many projects went 
ahead in very marginal areas such as Totara Flat on the west 
Coast. 
Due to the nature of forest projects with their long 
time horizons there is a large amount of uncertainty about 
the markets for products thirty to forty years away_ This 
makes prediction of financial returns difficult a the best of 
times (van Wyk, 1986). Therefore, the assumptions made by 
the Forest Service were difficult to refute especially since 
the source of information was often based on internally 
generated studies. 
Even so, the Forest Service was accused of deliberately 
underestimating growing costs and being over optimistic in 
its planning forecasts to justify a large portion of the 
second pine planting boom of the 1960s and 1970s (Grant, 
1987). The implication is that the decisions concerning new 
projects had already been completed and that IRR 
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evaluation procedure was undertaken only as a requirement not 
as an aid to decision-making. 
Even though there was a large amount of controversy 
concerning the uses of indigenous forest under the Forest 
service's management there appears to have been no use of 
systematic analysis at any time. The Forest Service was 
required to provide management plans to the public for 
submissions, but there was no requirement by the Forest 
Service to do any systematic analysis, financial or 
otherwise. None of these management plans had any form of 
systematic analysis. In fact, these management plans tended 
to be broad statements which allowed for the maximum amount 
of managerial discretion. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The New Zealand Forest Service was an institution that never 
truly outgrew its original function even when that function 
had supposedly been superceded by a new set of objectives. 
This reluctance to change was partly due to the 
organisational structure which was set up to perform the 
original function of timber production. It was also due to 
the dominance of a profession that had training and values 
which reinforced that traditional role and a political 
environment which condoned the continued use of those values. 
Foresters like most professionals can exhibit an 
arrogance towards any layman who may have sincere concern 
over the workings of that profession. was a political 
sUb-system of Forest service professionals, politicians, 
industry interests and regional iness 
that made the Forest Service less responsive to other 
sections of the public. 
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It would be wrong to totally condemn all the 
professionals in the organisation as they did achieve 
considerable advances in multiple-use forestry, but often 
this was largely due to considerable public pressure and very 
often grudingly given. 
The repercussions of this lack of accountability to the 
public at large was that as the New Zealand Forest Service 
fell into disrepute the concept of multiple use reosurce 
management was also denigrated. There was a definite need 
for a reform of the Forest Service and reform arrived in 1984 
with the election of a new Government. 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM 
4.1 Rationale for the Reform 
In 1984, Treasury proposed a reform of the Public Sector 
(Boston, 1987). Treasury considered that the Public 
Sector's poor performance economically was due to the 
following:-
(a) Most departments had no clearly defined goals; 
28 
(b) Most departments had no clearly specified management 
plan; 
(c) There were few effective control mechanisms to review 
the performance of departments in meeting their output 
requirements; 
(d) Departmental managers had little freedom to change 
the way their departments operated to meet their goals, they 
lacked the autonomy they needed, within an overall 
expenditure limit, to use their judgement to produce the best 
results; 
(e) Too much emphasis was placed on the control of 
inputs; 
(f) There were no effective review mechanisms for dealing 
with poor performance in senior management within departments 
(Treasury,1984:279). 
Following directly from that diagnosis of the problem 
the principles or objectives of the reforms can be summarised 
as: 
1. Separation of commercial from non-commercial 
functions. The removal of conflicting goals, giving clearer 
object 
2. Separation of advisory and administrative functions; 
3. The principle of user-pays, the assumption that 
goods and services provided by the state should be paid for 
on full cost-recovery basis; 
4. Transparency of subsidizations, if the Government 
requires a state-owned enterprise to provide, supply goods 
and services of a non-commercial nature it must pay for the 
provision of the service; 
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5. Competitive neutrality, the state-owned enterprise 
should be able to compete at no disadvantage with the private 
sector; 
6. Greater managerial discretion and decentralisation, 
all managers have the freedom to manage and in this way are 
more efficient; 
7. Improved accountability, this is the quest for 
improved financial accountability resulting from the more 
clearly defined objectives (Boston, 1987:432). 
The objective of establishing clearer non-conflicting 
goals resulted in the break up of the Forest Service and the 
Department of Lands and Survey. Out of the dissolution of 
these agencies came six new entities. Although, this 
separation was introduced to reduce conflicting objectives 
within a single agency, and enhance financial accountability, 
it will also have the effect of bringing conflict out into an 
arena external to any agency and thereby being more 
accountable to the public (Halkett,1987). 
There is also an implicit assumption held by some that 
separation of functions and the resulting allocation of land 
between the new agencies will result in less conflict as land 
will either be purely for conservation or production purposes 
(Salmon,1987; Egan,1987). 
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4.2 The New Government Agencies 
The new agencies resulting from the reorganisation were a 
Forestry Corporation, a Land Corporation, a Department of 
Conservation, a Department of Survey and Land Information and 
a Ministry of Forestry. 
The abolition of the Commission of the Environment also 
occurred at this time and was replaced by two new entities; 
a Ministry for the Environment and a Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment (Gregory, 1987) • 
The Land Corporation and Forestry Corporation are both 
state-owned enterprises. Their objectives are to operate as 
successful businesses, in the farming and forestry sectors 
respectively (New Zealand Land Corporation,1987;New Zealand 
Forestry Corporation,1987). Social and environmental 
considerations are of secondary importance (Boston/1987). 
Both are pro-development organisations, which act as 
businesses and are motivated to make a profit. 
The Department of Conservation is a government 
department. It has two major functions. The first 
function is to manage conservation areas and other land under 
its authority. The second function is to advocate the 
conservation of natural and historic resources and the 
principles of conservation. It has secondary functions of 
fostering recreation and tourism, but not at the expense of 
conservation (Department of Conservation, 1987) . 
The Department has the role of advising other organisations 
when it feels the interests of conservation are threatened 
especially on Crown lands but also on private land. 
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The Ministry of Forestry is a government department with 
advisory, research and regulatory functions. It advises 
Government about the forest sector. It provides a farm 
forestry advisory service. The Ministry also administers 
the Forest Research Institute and provides various regulatory 
functions to the sector. The user-pays principle 
applies to all the functions. The Mission statement clearly 
places the role of the Ministry to promote the forestry 
sector (Ministry of Forestry,1987). 
The last Government department affecting environmental 
management in New Zealand is the Ministry for the 
Environment. The Ministry was established to promote good 
environmental manag~ment. 
In achieving these objectives the Ministry has functions 
such as advising Government, guiding the development of 
Environmental Impact reports, promoting environmental 
awareness, consulting with various interest groups, 
disseminating information, and mediating arguments between 
groups over environmental issues (Environment Act 1986). It 
is within this last role that the Ministry is most directly 
involved in the environmental management arena. 
The Effect of Single Objectives on Bureaucratic Behaviour 
The setting of clear objectives was to ensure that the 
agencies I performance could be more clearly determined and 
that poor performance would be accountable (Boston,19B7). 
In situations where such reforms of bureaucracy have 
occurred elsewhere, the results have extended beyond the 
achievement of eff management in 
agencies such as these can become so goal-orientated that 
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the functions of the agencies become a means to achieving 
specific set goals (Gregory,1987). In case of the 
state-owned enterprises, the objective is returning a pro 
The same might also be true for an agency that have a 
speci goal of conserving New Zealand's resources. How 
these goals are achieved may become of secondary importance. 
Flynn (1986:393) states that "replacing professional 
judgement with measurement and financial incentives can 
produce more rather than less rigid attitudes." Therefore, 
the reform which intended to give more discretion to regional 
managers may in reality be limiting their flexibility by 
setting specific and limiting goals, against which their 
performance can be easily checked. There is a trade off 
between accountability and monitoring versus flexible 
objectives which can be changed as required making them 
difficult for managers to achieve (Gregory, 1987) . 
4.3 Conflict between Agencies 
This lack of flexibility of the new government agencies 
becomes a major problem when it is necessary for them to 
respond to the demands of other groups. 
The likelihood of conflict became apparent when as a 
part of the restructuring there were difficulties in 
allocating land to the various new administrative agencies. 
This difficulty was essentially between the state-owned 
enterprises and the Department of Conservation (Egan,1987). 
In some High country pastoral leases and relatively 
unmodified riverbeds confl have occurred between the Land 
Corporation the Department of over who 
best suited to administer that land. 
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Both agencies see the 
resource as falling within their administration (Egan,1987). 
The same situation has occurred between the Department 
of Conservation and the Forestry corporation. The issue is 
largely concerned with the future of indigenous forest 
management. As a result of these allocation problems, the 
originally intended temporary agency which was the Land 
Department is still in existence. 
Conflicts over allocation will occur in the future 
because land that has been designated as conservation land, 
may in the future be required for development (Kirkland, 
1987). In this situation, the conflict between those who 
see land under the Department of Conservation management as 
being held for future needs and those who consider the land 
as being preserved in perpetuity (Kirkland, 1987; 
Salmon,1987). Any change in the status of conservation land 
will be seen as a threat by both the conservation movement 
and the Department of Conservation. 
The possibility of interagency conflict over 
jurisdiction is termed "bureaucratic imperialism". In 
agencies dependent on budget allocations, job security 
often equated by personnel as depending on securing an 
adequate allocation. Any loss of jurisdiction is a threat 
to that allocation and must be resisted (Holden,1966). 
It would seem inevitable that conflict will occur 
between the Department of Conservation on one side, and the 
pro-development agencies on the other. 
34 
4.4 The Local Government Reform 
There is a need to comment on the forthcoming reform of local 
government in relation to the new land management agencies. 
Local government will be another actor in this arena and 
can be expected to be motivated towards development within 
their regions. 
This premise is based on the likelihood that the 
Government will devolve more authority to the regional level 
(perkinson,1988). The Government is also decreasing the 
amount of revenue sharing with local authorities (Anon.1988). 
Therefore, they will be forced to increase revenue at a 
local level by increasing the rates. Most rates are paid by 
commercial interests. It will be in the local authorities' 
interests to increase commercial activity in their areas, but 
they will be competing with other local authorities in 
attracting business to their areas. 
The implications of this competition for commercial 
development is that environmental standards may be lowered so 
as not to present a barrier to new development. The local 
authorities are likely to come into conflict with 
conservation interests (The Port Hills Gondola Scheme and 
Pinnacles Development would seem to be examples of this 
trend). 
4.5 Conclusion 
The prediction that the new single purpose agencies resulting 
from the reform will be engaged in more unresolved conflict 
has implications to the effective management of New Zealand's 
resources. 
At the same time as society is real ing that the 
environment is interrelated and that is therefore 
necessary to have an integrated approach to resource 
management, there has been an institutional reform which 
seems to refute this premise. 
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The new institutional arrangements do not reflect such 
an integrated approach and it would seem to be an attempt by 
Government to separate the environment into discreet 
profit/non-profit resources. This of course, is impossible 
to achieve and conflict over resource allocation and use will 
be the result. 
This conflict will occur in a forum external to the 
agencies and therefore will be much more open to the public. 
In the multiple-use agencies, many of the conflicts that 
occurred between production and non-production functions 
would have been quietly resolved within the agency_ In such 
an environment of internal or secret conflict resolution, 
compromise would seem to be more likely to be achieved; even 
if these compromises may not have accurately reflected the 
wants of society. 
The new situation with accountaility and easily measured 
performance criteria would seem to require an obligation from 
the interested agencies that they enter the conflict arena 
and that they not compromise so as to achieve their agency's 
objectives. Therefore, there may be an obligation for an 
agency to enter conflicts when it may not desire to. This 
situation may be the reason behind the Department of 
Conservation's involvement in the Cora Lynn proposal. 
In conclusion, it would seem that the philosophy behind 
the reform was primarily concerned with achieving financial 
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and economic efficiency of the productive aspects of the 
Government's environmental administration. The extension of 
this philosophy to the non-productive aspects seems to have 
almost been an after thought irrespective of the 
effectiveness of such a policy in this context. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CORA LYNN CASE STUDY 
5.1 Commercial Forestry in the Canterbury High Country 
Considerable discussion has occurred over the suitability of 
various types of commercial forestry in the Canterbury High 
Country. There are three main types of commercial forestry 
being considered in this area: protection forestry; shelter-
belts; and commercial woodlots. 
It is not within the scope of this study to cover all 
these issues here (refer to O'Connor,1987; Murray, 1986) . In 
summary, it can be said that considerable areas of the sub-
alpine environment have potential for forestry. Legard and 
Belton, (1985) have defined rainfall and aspect as two of the 
most important site factors and have calculated that about 
two percent of the area of the Canterbury High Country has 
good potential for forestry. 
The other factor that should be mentioned affecting 
forestry development in this area are the attitudes of the 
High Country farmers towards forestry. Murray (1986) found 
that although opinions varied, they were generally favourable 
towards the development of farm forestry_ Attitudes were 
not favourable towards large-scale commercial forestry which 
they saw as a threat to traditional ownership patterns. 
Financial considerations were found to be the limiting 
factor of actual development of woodlot forestry. Farmers 
need to accumulate and hold capital to begin with due to the 
nature of forest enterprises, as returns do not accrue until 
periods of thirty to seventy years have passed. 
Woodlot forestry was seen by a low 
priority during the early stages of farm development with the 
emphasis at this stage being on the development of shelter-
belts. 
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At a later stage of farm development when some capital has 
accumulated, personal reasons such as a belief in a more 
balanced and diversified landscape may encourage the planting 
of a woodlot. It is seen as something that could be left 
for the farmers' children or grandchildren. Financial 
considerations such as profit were found to be of secondary 
importance and the effect of forest encouragement grants when 
they existed, was found to be marginal. 
These attitudes have been found to exist amongst farmers 
in the North Island also (Smaller & Meister,1983). 
5.2 The Cora Lynn Proposal 
Background to the Project 
In 1987, the Ministry of Forestry prepared a management plan 
for the leaseholder of the Cora Lynn station who was 
interested in planting a commercial woodlot (M. Belton per 
cOIDID,1988) . 
The Ministry of Forestry acting as forest consultants 
presented a management plan which proposed the planting of 
around 150ha of predominantly Douglas fir (Pseudotsuga 
menzeii) with small plantings of Corsican pine (Pinus nigra 
spp larico) and European larch (Larix decidua). 
The site was located on the slopes of Mount Horrible 
above the Cass River (refer to Map 2). The area was 
classified as class 6 land and was on Crown leasehold. It 
had historically been used for pastoral ing and had 
carried between 0.2 and 0.3 stock units hectare. was 
considered by the Ministry of Forestry and the leaseholder 
that this area had low potential for pastoral grazing. 
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It 
was proposed that the Douglas fir be planted for a 42 year 
growing rotation with the option of going into a selective 
logging mode on a longer rotation length. There was also an 
option for a production thinning for increased revenue and 
some earlier cashflow (Belton,1987). (Appendix 1) 
Planning Procedures 
Due to the fact that the land is Crown leasehold there were 
certain approval procedures other than the usual that had to 
be undertaken. 
The interim management agreement between the new 
institutional agencies which confers managerial 
responsibility for Crown leasehold to the Land Corp requires 
that there be consultation between Land Corp and the 
Department of Conservation on sensitive planning matters. 
The Department of Conservation also has a role in 
regards to forestry and regional planning. This is defined 
by the Canterbury united Council's regional planning scheme 
which describes the department's role as: 
1. Upon request the Department of Conservation will 
provide advice on the environmental impacts of forest 
planting proposals; 
2. The Department will oppose tree planting proposals 
where significant conservation values are likely to be 
affected by the trees (Belton,1987). 
At Malvern county planning hearing in August 1987, 
the Department of Conservation's initial response from its 
principal planner, its landscape arch and its botanist 
was generally favourable, but with qualifications. this 
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hearing objections were heard from the Federated Mountain 
Clubs (FMC), Doctor C.J. Burrows of the Department of Plant 
and Microbial Sciences University of canterbury, and Doctor 
D. Norton of the School of Forestry, university of canterbury 
(Belton,1987b). 
The Federated Mountain Club's objection related largely 
to landscape values and the high visibility of the location, 
either while travelling along State Highway 73 or tramping up 
the Cass River. It was felt that this would result in a 
considerable loss of wilderness experience. 
Drs Burrows and Norton were largely concerned with the 
loss of botanical values to various ecological communities; 
predominantly areas of regenerating native scrub and the 
ecologically sensitive Mount Horrible bog. They were also 
concerned by the possible threat of wilding spread into 
ecologically important areas and the loss of teaching and 
research potential to the nearby Cass field station 
(Forsyth,1987) . 
The plan was approved by the planning hearing with minor 
modifications which were incorporated into the management 
plan (Belton, 1987b) . 
In a letter to Land corp on,6 November 1987, the 
Department of Conservation declared that it had changed its 
position from one of qualified approval to complete 
opposition to the project. It used the same objections 
raised at the planning hearing by the Federated Mountain 
Clubs and Drs Burrows and Norton as the basis of this change 
in position (Forsyth,1987). 
The position then became one of conflict between the 
Land Corp, the Ministry of Forestry and the leaseholder on 
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one side and the Department of Conservation as 
advocate for the conservation interests on the other. This 
situation has continued until the present with no compromise 
by either side. The result of this has been that the issue 
is going to Cabinet committee for adjudication (C. Anstey per 
comm,1988). 
Incorporated into the original management plan was a 
summary of an economic evaluation of the project. This was 
appended to the text but no mention of the financial returns 
was made in the text. 
On 27 November 1987, the consultant forester for the 
project wrote a letter to Land Corp replying to the 
Department of Conservation's objections to the project. In 
the body of the letter, considerable space was given to 
describing the financial benefits of the project. This 
section opened with the sentence fla comprehensive economic 
evaluation of the Cass Douglas fir regime has been undertaken 
which examines sensitivity to a range of product prices, 
processing and transport options, rotation length and yield" 
(Belton, 1987b:6). In fact, only the results of the first 
two variables were disclosed and implies that variation in 
transport costs would make little difference to the result. 
Using the results of the financial analysis Belton then 
states "it is submitted that afforestation of the project 
area by far the most productive use of this land". He 
then closes the section by saying "it is submitted that to 
justify the Department of Conservation's blanket opposition 
to the proposal equal compelling counter are 
."(Belton,1987b:6} At the same time as this 
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letter was written, Land Corp requested an extended version 
of the economic evaluation. It is presumed that Land Corp 
requested this to use at its discussions with the Department 
of Conservation (M. Belton per comm,1988). 
Before the issue goes to Cabinet committee, the Ministry 
of Forestry will also be required to make a presentation but 
as yet no information is available on the nature of this 
presentation and the role the systematic analysis will play 
in it. 
5.3 Analysis of the Economic Evaluation 
Forestry has inherent characteristics which make planning 
both an essential p~erequisite and at the same time difficult 
to achieve (Murray, 1986} . Most commercial processing 
investments are based on relatively short planning horizons 
of about 15 to 20 years. Timber growers require longer 
planning horizons with impacts often felt well after planting 
(Van Wyk,1986). This time scale means that forestry 
investment is relatively inflexible in the short to medium 
term and can be represented as having a high degree of 
irreversability, as once started, it is costly to change. 
This long time horizon then introduces a larger than normal 
component of uncertainty into any financial analysis. 
Discount Rates 
One effect of this long term nature is that determining the 
correct discount rate is important when trying to predict the 
returns from any forestry project (Murray,1986). 
In the two common methods of deriving a 
discount rate are: 
1. The cost of borrowing; 
2. The opportunity cost of investing the money 
elsewhere (Fraser, 1986) • 
The problem with both these methods, that over a 
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forty year time span, both the cost of borrowing and return 
on other investments will change considerably. In the past, 
discount rates have been set arbitrarily by the Government 
for Forest Service forestry projects. 
Generally, though, growth rates of trees in New Zealand 
rarely achieve the interest rates that have existed in this 
country over the last twenty years. Jacobssen (1984) in her 
study of farm forestry concluded that financial returns for 
forestry were not favourable, however, financial cost benefit 
analysis was not an adequate means for assessing the net 
benefit of forestry to the farmer as other values have to be 
considered. 
The Ministry of Forestry in its analysis has used a 
discount rate of 7% which they have based upon the long term 
Government stock investments, but in itself this rate is 
largely irrelevant. It is merely a means of giving a 
comparison to other types of investment, not as a means of 
predicting return on the investment. 
predicting Markets 
In the management plan, it is assumed that a market for 
Douglas fir will exist because there is considerable demand 
for the timber at the moment, and demand is expected to 
increase in the future. 
premise that Douglas 
prediction is based on the 
a traded timber on the 
Pacific rim of the United states and Canada and since 
traditional sources of this timber in those countries are 
running out, New Zealand supplies will naturally fill this 
shortfall. 
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This assumption is simplistic, as New Zealand Douglas 
fir has different characteristics from timber produced in the 
Northern hemisphere and timber users are slow substitute 
to alternative species and/or sources. This is especially 
important in the case of Douglas fir as its major end use is 
as framing timber in the construction industry, which is by 
nature a conservative industry. 
Another complication to predicting demand, is that by 
the time this woodlot is producing in 2031, New Zealand will 
have Pinus radiata resource at least three and a half times 
the current supply. A large portion of this timber supply 
will be suitable for the same functions as Douglas fir 
(Harris,1986). 
Besides this competition from within the country, there 
are rapid developments in forestry in countries such as Chile 
and Brazil and more importantly within the United states 
itself (R. Cooper,per comm(1986). 
Costs and Revenues 
Because it is impossible to predict the long term effect of 
inflation on costs and prices, the usual practice is to 
freeze financial data in present day values. This is 
equivalent to assuming that long term inflation will affect 
costs and prices in the same way or that costs and prices 
will inflate at the same rate. This is the only practical 
method since there is no of determining the flow on 
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effects of price increases in one commodity, for example oil, 
through to other commodities. 
The economic evaluation of the Cora Lynn project is based 
on this principle and would seem to be justified by the fact 
this balance between prices and revenues has occurred over 
the last twenty years (Belton, 1987c) . 
In the economic evaluation, three price sensitivities 
were used; $65 per cubic metre, $95 per cubic metre, and 
$125 per cubic metre for saw logs delivered to the mill skid. 
Two price sensitivities were used for stumpages for 
production thinning at age 27 years; $25 and $30 per cubic 
metre. At present Douglas fir of similar quality is fetching 
between $70 and $80. per cubic metre at the mill door in 
Canterbury and this has been a typical price over the last 
few years. 
No justification is given in the economic evaluation for 
the range of price sensitivities used and why the 
distribution of these prices is skewed towards the upper 
range of the current prices. 
silvicultural Factors affecting the Economic Evaluation 
Growth rates for the project are based on one study by Legard 
and Belton (1985). In this study five species were studied 
including Douglas fir. The study involved the measurement 
of existing stands in seven Canterbury catchments (Waitaki, 
Rangitata and South Ashburton, Rakaia, North Ashburton, 
Waimakariri, Hurunui, and Waiau) • 
Legard and Belton (1985) used the maximum mean annual 
increment of volume (MAIV) as the indicator of 
productive capacity. The figure for Douglas was based 
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upon a study of 24 plots with an average age of 41 years. 
Growth and site factors were investigated significant 
relationships. Average rainfall was" found to be the most 
important variable, with rainfall of above 1200mm producing 
the best growth. Soil type, aspect, slope and exposure were 
also found to affect growth but to a much lesser extent 
(Legard & Belton,1985). 
In moist areas such as the Cora Lynn site, MAIV max was 
31.2 m3/ha/yr at age 50. For the Cora Lynn management plan, 
a MAIV of 30.8 m3/ha/yr at age 50 was used. The reason for 
this figure not given, though it is premised it is an 
average of the plots in the moist areas. 
MAIV varies throughout the rotation. At age 42, it is 
approximately 96% of the maximum MAIV and at thinning age (27 
years), it is approximately 72% of the maximum rate. Thus 
volume at age 42 years is only equal to .96x30.8x42 or 
1240m3/ha. This figure is then reduced by the amount of 
merchantable timber that can be removed when cutting. This 
figure depends on the products desired and the cutting 
strategy. In this case, 85% of the volume is expected to be 
recovered. This is the same figure given by the out turn of 
Douglas fir from Ashley forest and Kaingaroa and can be 
expected from any reasonably tended stand. 
Growth rates and merchantable volume return on Douglas 
fir can be affected by: heavy snows, which increase the 
likelihood of malformation; decreasing merchantable volume 
and unseasonal frosts which can stop growth and cause 
malformation; and waterlogged or impeded drainage soils. 
Silvicultural practices can also affect the growth rate. 
Thinning is a required part of the regime and it 
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necessary to time it so as to delay it as long as possible. 
This is done to minimise branch ze and thereby increase 
timber strength, but cannot be delayed too long as this will 
reduce volume growth. In this way pruning is not required 
for Douglas fir. The problem occurs when it is uncertain 
whether there is a market for the thinnings. If there is a 
market for a thinning, it can be delayed to age 27 or 30 so 
as to have timber of a reasonable size. If there is no 
market, then a thinning to waste is required but this has to 
be done before age 12 so as to allow the slash to decay 
before harvesting. The problem of course, is that if a 
production thinning was planned, but there is no market at 
the time of thinnin~, the slash left behind is so large that 
it will not decay and must be taken away at considerable 
cost. In the Cora Lynn project the initial 1600 stems per 
hectare is reduced to approximately a final stocking of 1085 
stems per hectare. 
For simplicity's sake, it was assumed that thinning has 
no effect on the final volume of the stand. This is not 
generally the case, as thinning reduces the standing volume 
while at the same time increasing the size (and value) of the 
residual trees. Whether these two factors cancel out cannot 
be foreseen but the generally accepted practice is to assume 
so. It could be better practice in this situation to be 
slightly pessimistic and assume some decrease in final 
volume. 
The long nature of investment in forestry poses an 
obvious problem for the projection of data relating to events 
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far in the future. This uncertainty, notwithstanding, the 
analyst still expected to produce meaningful results for 
the decision maker. The statement of results as a single 
value estimate provides no indication of the characteristics 
of other possible results (Fraser,1986). The need is for 
alternative scenarios to be analysed. The first step in 
carrying out a sensitivity analysis is to identify the 
physical and financial elements which have the greatest 
effect on the results (Fraser,1986:93). 
In this case, sensitivities have examined only on prices 
of thinnings and final fellings and on various transport 
distances. 
Often, the most important variable can be the growth 
rate. If the growth rate is slower than predicted, it means 
that production at the end of the rotation will be 
considerably less, reducing revenue. still worse, the 
length of the rotation may have to be extended so as to make 
harvesting more efficient. The extension of rotation length 
has considerable negative impacts on the discounted revenue. 
This variable should have been tested especially given the 
fact that the growth rate was only based on one study. 
The Ministry of Forestry's economic evaluation gave a 
range of internal rates of return. The worst case scenario 
which had low wood prices and high transport costs gave an 
LR.R of 8.5% 
The best case scenario gave an I.R.R of 11.8% The medium 
scenario with medium prices and milling in Darfield was 
considered the most probable alternative gave an I.R.R of 
10 7% (Belton,1987c). These are good in 
comparison with most forestry projects 
5.4 Five Alternative Scenarios 
For the purpose of this project, five new scenarios were 
undertaken so as to extend the sensitivity analysis. 
The first two scenarios have been undertaken to 
determine how sensitive the results of the analysis were to 
changes in the growth rate. 
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In the first scenario, the assumption is that changes in 
the weather patterns caused by the greenhouse effect have 
occurred. The result of this change has been a drop in the 
average rainfall below the 1200mm per year mark. This in 
turn has caused a drop in the growth rate from a MAIV at age 
50 of 30.8 cubic metres per year per hectare to 27.0 cubic 
metres per year per hectare. 
In the second scenario, the changes in weather patterns 
have been advantageous to forestry and in addition there has 
been excellent tending of the stand. The result has been an 
increase in the growth rate with the MAIV at age 42 now 31.7 
cubic metres per year per hectare (33m3/yr/ha at age 50). 
Costs are assumed to have remained the same as in the 
medium scenario done by the Ministry of Forestry (Appendix 
2) • 
The results of this analysis indicate that changes in 
growth rate makes a small change to the results. A low 
growth rate only reduced the internal rate of return from 
10.7% to 10.3%. The high growth rate raised the IRR from 
10.7% to 11% (Appendix 3). 
The next two scenarios looked the effect of changing 
two variables at once. These two were growth rate 
(by the same amount as the scenarios) and market price 
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(Appendix 4). Market prices were used that attempted to 
reflect a more even distribution around the current market 
price. The low market price was set at $50 per cubic metre. 
Based on an assumption that an oversupply of framing timber 
had occurred on the market and the resulting competition had 
driven down the price. A production thinning was carried 
out but received a low stumpage $20 per cubic metre. 
The alternative scenario was based on the assumption 
that due to good marketing practices, New Zealand Douglas 
fir has been accepted on the American West coast as a 
substitute for the locally grown variety. Prices remain 
strong, exceeding the Ministry of Forestry's predictions and 
reaching $130 per cubic metre. These strong prices are also 
reflected in prices received for production thinnings which 
are supplied to China for the use as pit props. stumpages 
remain at the high price of $35 per cubic metre. All other 
assumptions used in the original evaluation are used in this 
evaluation. 
The low growth , low price scenario returned an IRR of 
around 7.1%. This was still above the selected discount 
rate of 7% but considerably lower than the Ministry of 
Forestry worst case scenario of 8.5%. 
The high growth rate, high market price scenario was 
based on the assumption that everything went right (more luck 
than any forester deserves). Yet it only gave an internal 
rate of return of just under 12%. This was only slightly 
more than the Ministry of Forestry's best scenario of 11.8%. 
As a worst case scenario the of not having a 
production thinning was examined. Instead of a production 
thinning, a waste thinning at age 10 was undertaken. All 
other values were the same as the low growth, low market 
price scenario. 
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This single variable had a major impact on the result 
with the IRR dropping from 7.1% found in the low growth, low 
price scenario to around 5.6% (Appendix 5). 
5.5 Conclusion 
The case study of Cora Lynn would seem to indicate that the 
predicted conflicts over areas that have potential for more 
than one use, especially those with conservation values, has 
begun to occur. The role that systematic analysis, in this 
case economic evaluation, will play in this conflict is still 
in the early stages: 
What can be seen is that early on in the developments, 
the economic evaluation was not considered of primary 
importance in the planning process. This is reflected in 
the amount of space and position of the economic evaluation 
in the original management plan. 
was only when conflict between the pro-development 
faction (Land Corp and Ministry of Forestry), and the 
Department of conservation began to occur, that increasing 
reference to, and expansion of the economic evaluation 
occurred. Comments by the consultant forester in his letter 
to Land Corp answering the objections by the Department of 
Conservation show that he considered that a reasonable 
objection against the project to be those based on similar ie 
economic, evaluation methods (Belton,1987b). 
The prediction that any evaluation method used by a 
partisan body will have bias 
this case 
more difficult to sustain in 
As already discussed in forestry, due to the long planning 
horizon involved, many assumptions have to be made about 
future market, even the type climate over the period of 
growth. To say whether those assumptions are not valid is 
impossible. What can be done is to undertake a range of 
sensitivity analyses on the crucial variables. 
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In this case, sensitivities were carried out on two 
variables, transport distance to the mill and the final price 
of timber over a range of three prices. The first variable 
by the analyst's own admission is relatively unimportant. 
The question is then, why was it included in the evaluation? 
The second variable is more important and does influence 
the result to a gre~t extent, but the question to be asked 
here, is why those prices and that price range? At present 
the price ranges between $70 to $80 per cubic metre at the 
mill door. This is towards the lower end of the range of 
prices used in the sensitivity analysis. No reason is given 
why it is expected that average prices are expected to 
increase over the next forty years. Surely a sensitivity 
analysis with price as the variable should vary about the 
current mean equally (unless the current mean is atypical) . 
The analysis given as the average example, in the extended 
economic evaluation had a mill door price of $95 per cubic 
metre which is considerably above the range of current 
prices. 
The next question is why was not a sensitivity analysis 
of growth rates done? Also why was the figure of 30.8 
m3/ha/yr used? If it an average growth rate of the 
Douglas plots in the high rainfall area, it not 
disclosed either in the economic evaluation or in the 
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original study of growth rates. There is also an assumption 
that if the growth has been one level over the last forty 
years then the next forty years will be the same. Again 
such an assumption is simplistic. and a sensitivity analysis 
should have been done varying the rate so as to determine 
whether this variable had a significant 
of the evaluation. 
on the result 
By taking a worst case scenario and a best case scenario 
using a greater range of prices and varying the growth rate, 
it was possible to get a low internal rate of return of 7.1% 
and a high of 12%. 
The assumptions made were extensions of the variables 
used by the Ministry of Forestry. How realistic these 
assumptions are, cannot be determined except by possibly 
doing some sort of. survey of potential forest owners and 
having them apportion probabilities to the various outcomes. 
The internal rate of return was decreased significantly 
by assuming that a production thinning was not carried out. 
This could have been due to the fact that no market was 
available which has occurred on occasions in Douglas fir 
marketing in the North Island (williams,1986). 
The economic evaluation did not discuss the 
repercussions of this alternative regime though it was 
mentioned in passing in the management plan. 
In general, it can be said that there would seem to be a 
tone of optimism about the expected economic returns from 
this project. This optimism was not balanced against the 
probabilities of failure even though it may be a very remote 
probability. Therefore, would seem that is some 
truth the second prediction that any evaluation taking 
place in this sort of institutional environment will have 
some degree of bias. 
54 
Whether the bias was a deliberate attempt to influence 
the decision-making process when initially done is impossible 
to determine. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
6.1 Systematic Analysis and the New Zealand Forest service 
It was difficult to make the Forest Service accountable, as 
decisions were often resolved within the organisation. 
Systematic analysis was not used until it was imposed upon 
the Service by Treasury. The decision criteria imposed by 
Treasury was unrealistic for most forestry projects. This 
meant that the Forest Service in many cases had to slant the 
assumptions in such a way as to give the appearance of 
achieving a 10% internal rate of return. They could do this 
because the assumptions they made were difficult to refute, 
due to the long planning horizons and the large degree of 
uncertainty about future markets and prices for forest 
products. 
The decisionmaking process had already been completed 
before the analysis had begun. without critical review by 
Treasury the evaluation procedure was just a minor hurdle to 
be passed before the project could be instigated. 
Evaluation procedures were only used in the approval of 
new projects. These methods were not used to help 
distinguish between various options in on going operations 
such as the mix of production and non-production operations 
in a state forest park. 
Due to the way in which these procedures were used, 
their validity was questioned. This questioning occurred 
from both the conservation movement and Treasury. 
It has been described that in similar cases economic 
evaluation ( . cost benefit analys ), has been misused 
overseas, and as a result the method itself has been 
discredited. In this case, the method used was not blamed, 
but the institution in which it was used. 
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6.2 Systematic Analysis in the New Institutional Environment 
Given the expectation of increased conflict resulting from 
the creation of several single purpose organisations, it can 
be expected that the use of evaluation methods in the debate 
will increase. Also given the current philosophy of 
economic efficiency in the Government sector and in the 
country in general, it can be expected that evaluation 
methods based on notions of economic efficiency will be used 
frequently. 
Using evaluation methods such as cost-benefit analysis 
as a means of advocacy is not new. In issues with high 
levels of value conflict the apparent validity of any 
argument may be increased by justifying these subjective 
values with some sort of apparently objective "rational" 
systematic analysis. The problem is that these methods are 
in part based upon subjective beliefs. Personal values 
necessarily influence the assumptions used and data collected 
in carrying out the analysis, and in interpreting the 
conclusions. 
It is a truism to say that nothing is entirely 
objective. The power of these methods is that they pose as 
being objective. In doing so, they can have the effect in 
this situation of stifling informed debate. People whose 
values are not structured in such a rational way, may feel 
that they have nothing useful to contribute. 
In effect the analytical procedure when in this 
context denigrates the value of people wishing to contribute 
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to the discussion but lacking the expertise to present it in 
this pseudo scientific manner. By reducing the number of 
people who feel able to participate, it is hoped by those who 
presented the analysis that the level of conflict will be 
reduced. The result of using systematic analysis in this 
manner is to effectively thwart public participation in the 
decision-making process. 
The Cora Lynn study shows that increasing importance has 
been placed on the economic evaluation in the decision-making 
process. At the same time, it cannot be expected that an 
institution having an ideological framework which favours one 
particular outcome can be totally neutral. 
Although, it may be interpreted that the analysis is 
optimistic towards the forestry project, there are no grounds 
to believe that any slant in the results of the Cora Lynn 
analysis is a result of any deliberate desire to ensure the 
completion of this project. A more realistic possiblility 
is that the bias was introduced unconsciously due to the 
professional values that the analyst has. 
Bias is therefore inevitable in any analysis as 
everybody has values, but the new institutional arrangement 
encourages this biased use of systematic analysis. As these 
analyses will be produced by partisan organisations, it is 
unrealistic to expect them not to be biased. Even if there 
is no overt pressure to bias the result, the analyst will be 
influenced by the work environment surrounding him/her and 
the training and values that made the analyst suitable for 
employment in that particular organisation. 
The new institutional arrangements were created make 
the management of public land more accountable the 
Government and the Public. In the old multiple-use 
agencies, important decisions were often resolved in such a 
way as to minimise public participation. Information 
concerning these decisions was difficult to attain and some 
sectors of the community felt that these organisations were 
undertaking a hidden agenda in collaboration with certain 
vested interests. In the case of the New Zealand Forest 
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service, this group of vested interests included politicians, 
timber industries and those concerned about regional 
employment. systematic analysis was imposed upon the 
Forest service in an attempt by Treasury to make the service 
finanacially accountable. This did not succeed as it was 
too easy for the fOFesters to manipulate the results of the 
analysis to support decisions that had already been made and 
this behaviour was often condoned by Government. 
with the new institutional arrangements, these 
analytical methods will be misused in a different way. with 
public participation forced upon the Government agencies 
during any conflict, it is in the interests of the various 
parties to gain support from the public. This could be 
achieved through a process of advocacy via the use of 
systematic analysis. In a world where science and the 
scientific method has considerable credibility, an argument 
couched in a scientific, quantifiable way often has more 
weight than an argument based on Igut feelings'. 
These new organisations have no choice but to compete 
for resources, as most of them are dependent on funds 
supplied through their own efforts. On the other hand, the 
Department of Conservation has an influential client group 
which will ensure that they perform in accordance with the 
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Department's objectives. In such a competitive environment, 
all possible resources will be used to win conflicts 
including systematic analysis. 
6.3 Recommendations for the Use of Systematic Analysis 
The use of systematic analysis will continue to be an 
important part of resource management. The desire to make 
rational decisions is fundamental to human nature, but these 
methods and any new methods devised in the foreseeable future 
will have the inherent problem of being based on values and 
having to rely on subjective assumptions in the course of the 
analysis. 
It is unrealistic to expect an individual to be 'value-
free', in order to perform an unbiased analysis, but 
individuals do not work in isolation. The institutional 
environment in which they work has a major influence on the 
way in which an analysis will be performed. 
In this study, two different institutional arrangements 
were analysed from the perspective of how systematic analysis 
was used or not used. In both cases the use of systematic 
analysis was less than ideal. 
In the case of the Forest service, the misuse of 
systematic analysis was partly caused by the restricted 
participation of the public due to resistance of a profession 
with a common ideology. This common professional ideology 
also made the use of systematic analysis redundant as 
conflicts were resolved through the use of this common 
ideology. 
Increasing public participation only part of 
answer. The new institutional arrangements public 
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participation or at least public scrutiny of the decision-
making process, but this was achieved by making the conflict 
external to agencies. 
Systematic analysis used in a situation by the 
partisan group to align or pacify the public. In effect, 
these methods can be used <to misinform the public. 
A possible way of achieving the improved use of 
systematic analysis is through: 
1. Having analysis carried out by non-partisan 
interests. 
2. Having informed public participation throughout the 
analysis. 
There are two possible ways of achieving non-partisan 
analysis. The first method is having a specific 
organisation that performs such analysis but it likely 
that all that would result from this is that all the land 
management agencies would attempt to refute the analysis with 
analyses of their own. 
The second possibility is that the land management 
agencies are made as non-partisan as possible. This could 
only be achieved by forming an agency that covered the range 
of land uses. In short, a multiple-use agency with a 
structure and professional makeup that did not favour either 
production or conservation or any specific type of land use 
would be ideal. 
The second point is the encouragement of public 
participation, not just at the decision-making phase, but 
during the evaluation itself. This is necessary to ensure 
that all assumptions are made icit and that the results 
of the analysis are not taken at face value. In this way, 
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the limitations of the methods are fully understood by the 
various participants in the conflict/decision-making process. 
It would be imposssible to have this openness from any 
agency that had a vested interest in one particular outcome 
as they would resist such interference in the achievement of 
the agency's objectives. 
Whether it is possible to create an organisation secure 
enough in its existence to allow such close interaction with 
the public is uncertain, but this problem thankfully 
beyond the scope of this study. 
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APPENDIX 1 
SUMMARY OF THE CORA LYNN 
PROPOSAL 
Source: Cora Lynn Management Plan, 
Ministry of Forestry, 1987. 
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CORA LYNN/CASS VALLEY 
FORESTRY PROPOSAL 
Afforestation is proposed for areas of Class VI land on Cora Lynn 
Pastoral lease in the lower Cass Valley. The objectives are 
multipurpose, namely commercial timber production, recreation/ 
tourism and amenity, and elsewhere in the area pastoral develop-
ment, nature conservation, educational and scientific reservation. 
The areas under consideration are identified on the maps as : 
Area A approx. 30 ha 
Area B approy-o 70 ha 
Area C approx. 55 ha 
The forests proposed are mostly Douglas Fir with use of European 
larch and Corsican Pine on sites particularly suited to these 
species. The Douglas Fir would be m~naged on a sawlog rotation of 
about 42 years, or on much longer rotations if selection logging 
were employed. Logging by skidder is practical over all the areas 
to landings in Areas D and E, and the existing 4wd tracks provide 
all the access needed. Logging traffic would exit across Cass 
River and thence to SH 73. Where required planting sites would be 
prepared by ripping, and scrub removed by V blade above ground 
level. Any fertilising would be by slow release fertiliser 
pellets buried alongside seedlings, and grass control around 
seedlings would be by spot spraying with Gardoprim. 
The principal reason for the proposed change from extensive 
pastoral Use to forestry is to achieve a more productive use from 
the land in question. Areas A, Band C are only marginal for 
grazing and pastoral development by 0.5. & T.D. and SUbdivision 
cannot be justified given the low soil fertility and cold aspect 
of the areas in question. continuation of past management, 
employing the occasional use of fire to control scrub regrowth can 
only cause further wastage of site nutrient capital, and carries 
the risk of fire running out of control onto fragile adjoining 
areas including steeplands with advanced scrub regeneration and 
mountain beech cover. 
The relatively fertile Class IV lands along the sout~ern edge of 
the Misery Swamp, and on the low alluvial terrace adjoining the 
Cass River would be separated from the forestry areas by fencing 
and retained in grazing. (Areas 0 and E respectively.) Area E is 
particularly suited to pastoral development so as to offset any 
loss of grazing opportunities in Areas A, Band C. 
Retention of the grazing areas provides 
visual contrast to the forested areas. 
also provide for fire control, wildling 
for different recreational uses. 
open foreground areas as a 
The grazing areas would 
seedling containment, and 
It is considered that well planned and executed tree planting CDn 
add interest and variety to the local landscape. In particular, 
attention will be given to creation of open glades and parkland 
settings on the lower slopes of the Misery fan to create sites for 
outdoor camps, lodges or similar. Maximising amenity and 
recreational values are important objectives along with the 
commercial goals of forest management. 
In addition to f6restry, recreation and grazing, the other 
important land use in the greater area is nature conservation. 
The Class VII and Class VIII lands above the proposed forestry 
areas would be retired from grazing and would also benefit from 
long term exclusion of fire. These steeplands rise spectacularly 
to the ridgelines of Mt Misery and Mt Horrible, and the elevated 
areas dominate and dwarf the Class VI down lands and lower fans. 
Tile steep lands were once largely beech forest covered and arc now 
clothed in patchworks of seral scrub and regenerating Nount"in 
Beech forest. Retirement ,<lould hasten regeneration of the beech 
forest. Plapting of Mountain Beech of local origin into manuk~ 
scrub in Area G is planned to assist regeneration in this area. 
Misery Swamp and Horrible Bog are excluded from the proposed 
forestry areas and riparian protection zones around these areas 
and along permanent streams are pcoposed. 
Soil conservation benefits will acrue with fire protection and 
development of forest cover on the Class VI (exotic) and VII and 
VIII (native) areas. Plantings with Corsican Pine are proposed 
over some of the subsoil erosion barrens in Area Band 
stabilisation plantings with willows, alders and on tile lower 
reaches of active shingle screes is proposed in Area C. 
The proposed afforestation areas have varied and complex edges 
including deep "baysn, and corridors of open glades. Along these 
edges, particularly toward the eastern sider amenity plantings are 
proposed to create complex and interesting forest borders. Forest 
edges provide good habitat for birds and other wildlife. 
lVildling spread is considered not to pose any real threat because 
strong prevailing NW winds would carry seed mostly onto Area 0, E 
and H, where grazing pressure would prevent establishment. If any 
spread occurred into conservation areas the forest owner would be 
responsible for its removal. 
Other exclusion areas would include a corridor along the stream 
from Horrible Bog to the Cass River, and the original Cora Lynn 
homestead site, and a 30m corridor along either side of the 
electricity transmission lines which pass along the southern 
of Areas A and B. 
At Cass Villtige, canterbury University have maintained the Cass 
Field Research station as a base for studying high country natural 
llistory for over 50 years. Any existing research plots or 
significant research areas within or around the project areas will 
be identified for protection. Scientific protectioll areas are 
identified to protect post pliestocene laminated silts beside Cass 
River and Horrible 80g, a wetland of national importance. 
It is contemplated that the Class VII and Class VIII steoplands 
and the Horrible Bog scientific protection area would be taken out 
of the lease in the event of freeholding of Class IV and VI areas 
of Run 327, and these retired areas would then be added to 
Craigieburn Forest Park, and be administered by the Department of 
Conservation. 
In the preparation of this plan assistance with information has 
been sought and obtained from DSIR, University of canterbury 
Botany Department, Land Corporation, Department of Conservation, 
North Canterbury Catchment Board, MOW and the Electricity 
corporation. Every effort has also been made to comply with 
Land Settlement Board policies. 
Generally it is considered that the Cass Basin allows a balanced 
allocation of land resources to be made, to provide for amenity 
forestry and recreational usc, grazing, production forestry, and 
for soil conservation and regeneration of Mountain Beech forest, 
and for protection of special areas such as the Horrible wetlands, 
and research areas. 
APPENDIX 2 
SUMMARY OF COSTS USED IN THE 
CORA LYNN ECONOMIC EVALUTION 
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DOUGLAS FIR REGIME 
Planted Area: 150ha. 
stocking: l600stems/ha 42yr Rotation. 
Final stocking: 1085 stems/haD 
Fencing project area 50% of cost against forestry project: 
$93/ha. 
Land preparation: ripping and V blading $120/ha. 
Seedling cost: 23c/seedling $368/ha. 
Seedling transport: 1.0c/seedling $16/ha. 
Release spraying gardoprim spot spray often 33% of project 
area at $110/ha. 
74 
Fertilising: 10% of project area; costs allowed $100/ha over 
33% of area. 
Contract planting: assume large scale operation of more than 
I 
35ha/season $384/ha. 
Animal Control: hares and possum $5/ha. 
Land Tax: Capital Value of Land less than $175 000 not 
applicable. 
Overheads $/ha/annum 
(a) Lease rental $3.60 
(b) Fire insurance but should av $4.00 
but should be graded to level of riSk. 
( c) Rates $0.42 
( d) Accountancy and legal $3.00 
( e) Forest consultancy $3.50 
( f) Miscellaneous $3.00 
Total Overhead $17.52ha/annum 
Logging costs: $15.0/m3 
Transport Costs: whole logs $0.174/m3.km :dressed timber 
$0.10/m3jkm. 
Source: Belton (1987c) 
cost of thinning to waste at age 10: $158/ha. 
Source: informal survey of local forestry contractors. 
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Year 0 
Year 27 
in 
Years 4-8 
COSTS COMMON TO ALL SCENARIOS 
Establishment, Fencing, silviculture and 
Roading: $177 900. 
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Roading costs for Production thinning (not 
on-thinning option): $7 500/ha. 
REVENUES COMMON TO ALL SCENARIOS 
Grazing of Sheep 
Total: $1 250/yr 
APPENDIX 3 
RESULTS OF ECONOMIC EVALUTION 
LOW GROWTH/MEDIUM PRICE SCENARIO 
HIGH GROWTH/MEDIUM PRICE SCENARIO 
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LOW GROWTH/MEDIUM PRICE 
SCENARIO 
78 
MAIV: 26m3/h/yr at age 42. 
Revenues 
Costs 
Thinning Volume: 33% of Standing Volume at age 27: 
173m3. 
Thinning Revenue: 150ha x $30 x 173m3 
Harvest Volume: 893m3. 
$778 500. 
Harvest Revenue: 150ha x $95 x 893m3 = $12 725 250. 
Logging: 150h x $15 x 893m3 = $2 009 250. 
Transport (if milled at Darfield): To Mill: $14.58 
x 150ha x 893m3 $1 952 991. From Mill to Port: 
$5.33 x 150ha x 446m3 = $356 577. 
Total Transport Cost: $2 309 568. 
Total Cost in year 42: $4 318 818. 
LOW GROWTH/JI'lEDIUM PRICE SCENARIO 
Year 8% 10% 12% 
0 
Fencing and -177900 -177900 -177900 
Establishment 
4 
Grazing +918 +854 +795 
+1250 
5 
+1250 +851 +776 +708 
6 
+1250 +787 +706 +633 
7 
+1250 +730 +641 +565 
8 
+1250 +675 +583 +505 
27 
Roading -938 -572 -351 
-7500 
27 
Thinning Revenue +97457 +59382 +36507 
+778500 
42 
Transport and 
Harvesting -170438 -78863 -37000 
-4318818 
42 
Harvest Revenue +502191 +232367 +109021 
+12725250 
overheads 
-2625/yr -32812 -25770 21687 
NPV +221522 +12142 -88230 
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF 
HIGH GROWTH/MEDIUM PRICE 
SCENARIO 
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MAIV: 31.7m3/ha/yr at age 42. 
Revenues 
Costs 
Thinning Volume: 33% of standing Volume at 
age 27:212m3. 
Thinning Revenue: 150ha x $30 x 212m3= $95 400. 
Harvest Volume: 1132m3. 
Harvest Revenue: 150ha x $95 x 1132m3 = $16 131 000. 
Logging: 150ha x $15~1132m3 = $2 547 000. 
Transport (if milled at Darfield): To Mill: $14.58 
x 150ha x 1132m3 = $2 475 684. From Mill to Port: 
$5.33 x 150ha x 566m3 = $452 517. 
Total Transport Costs: $2 928 201& 
Total Costs in Year 42: $5 475 201. 
HIGH GROWTH/MEDIUM PRICE SCENARIO 
Year 8% 10% 12% 
0 
Fencing and -177900 -177900 -177900 
Establishment 
4 
Grazing +918 +854 +795 
+1250 
5 
+1250 +851 +776 +708 
6 
+1250 +787 +706 +633 
+1250 +730 +641 +565 
8 
+1250 +675 +583 +505 
27 
Roading -938 -572 -351 
-7500 
27 
Thinning Revenue +119428 +72769 +44736 
+954000 
42 
Transport and 
Harvesting 216074 '-99979 -46907 
-5475201 
42 
Harvest Revenue +636595 +294556 +138199 
+16131000 
-2625/yr -·32812 -25770 -21687 
NPV +332260 +66664 -60704 
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RESULTS OF ECONOMIC EVALUTION 
LOW GROWTH/LOW PRICE SCENARIO 
HIGH GROWTH/HIGH PRICE SCENARIO 
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LOW GROWTH/LOW PRICE 
SCENARIO 
85 
MAIV: 26m3/ha/yr at age 42. 
Revenues 
Costs 
Thinning Volume: 33% of Standing Volume age 27: 
173m3. 
Thinning Revenue: 150ha x $20 x 173m3 $519 000. 
Harvest Volume: 893m3. 
Harvest Revenue: 150h x $50 x 893m3 $6 697 500. 
Logging: 150ha x $15 x 893m3 = $2 009 250. 
Transport (if milled at Darfield): To Mill: $14.58 
x 150ha x 893m3 = $1 952 991. From Mill to Port: 
$5.33 x 150ha x 446m3 $356 577. 
Total Transport Cost: $2 309 568. 
Total Costs in Year 42: $4 318 818. 
LOW GROWTH/LOW PRICE SCENARIO 
-
Year 6% 7% 8% 
0 
Fencing and -177900 -177900 --177900 
Establishment 
4 
Grazing +990 +953 +918 
+1250 
5 
+1250 +933 +891 +851 
6 
+1250 +881 +832 +787 
7 
+1250 +831 +778 +730 
8 
+1250 +783 . +727 +675 
27 
Roading 1555 -1206 ~938 
-7500 
-------
27 
Thinning Revenue +107623 +83523 +64972 
+519000 
42 
Transport and 
Harvesting 373696 ·-251910 -170438 
-4318818 
42 
Harvest Revenue +582682 +390655 +1261202 
+6697500 
Overheads 
-2625/yr -39964 -35312 ·-32812 
NPV +101599 +12030 ·,·51953 
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS or 
HIGH GROWTH/HIGH PRICE 
SCENARIO 
86 
MAIVi 31.7m3/ha/yr at age 42. 
Revenues 
Costs 
Thinning Volume: 33% of Standing Volume at age 27: 
212m3. 
Thin~ing Revenue: 150ha x $35 x 212m3 = $1 113 000. 
Harvest Volume: 1132m3. 
Harvest revenue: 150ha x $130 x 1132m3 = 
$22 074 000. 
Logging: 150ha x $15 x 1132m3 = $2 547 000. 
Transport (if milled at Darfield): To Mill: $14.58 
x 150ha x 1132m3 = $2 475 684. From Mill to Port 
$5.33 x 150ha x 556m3 = $452 517. 
Total Transport Cost: $2 928 201. 
Total Cost in Year 42: $5 475 201 
HIGH PRICE SCENARIO 
Year 10% 12% 15% 
0 
Fencing and --177900 177900 -177900 
Establishment 
4 
Grazing +854 +795 +715 
+1250 
5 
+1250 +776 +708 +621 
6 
+1250 +706 +633 +540 
7 
+1250 +641 +565 +470 
8 
+1250 +583 +505 +408 
27 
Roading -572 -351 -172 
-7500 
27 
Thinning Revenue +84897 +52192 +25565 
+1113000 
42 
Transport and 
Harvesting -99978 -46907 455 
-5475201 
42 
Harvest Revenue +403077 189114 62312 
+22074000 
Overheads 
-2625/yr -25770 -21687 -17450 
NPV +188213 -2332 -120346 
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APPENDIX 5 
RESULTS OF ECONOMIC EVALUATION 
WORST CASE SCENARIO 
LOW GROWTH/LOW PRICE 
NO PRODUCTION THINNING 
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WORST CASE SCENARIO: 
LOW GROWTH/LOW PRICE 
SCENARIO 
No Production Thinning 
MAIV: 26m3/ha/yr at age 42. 
Revenues 
No revenues from thinning. 
Harvest Volume: 893m3. 
Harvest Revenue: 150ha x $50 x 893m3 = $6 697 500. 
92 
Thinning to waste at age 10: $158 x 150ha $23 700. 
Logging: 150ha x $15 x 893m3 = $2 009 250. 
Transport (if, milled at Darfield): To Mill: $14.5 x 
150ha x 893m3 = $1 952 991. From Mill to Port: 
$5.33 x 150ha x 446m3 = $356 577. 
Total Transport Costs: $2 309 568. 
Total Costs in Year 42: $4 318 818. 
WORST CASE SCENARIO 
--
No Production Thinn 
Year 5% 6% 7% 
0 
Fencing and -177900 -177900 -177900 
Establishment 
4 
Grazing +1028 +990 +953 
+1250 
5 
+1250 +980 +933 +891 
6 
+1250 +932 +881 +832 
7 
+1250 +888 +831 +778 
8 
+1250 +846 +783 +727 
10 
Waste Thinning -14551 -13225 -12040 
-23700 
42 
Transport and 
Harvesting --556435 -373696 --251910 
-4318818 
42 
Harvest Revenue +862903 +582682 +390655 
+6697500 
overheads 
-2625/yr -45736 -39964 -35312 
NPV +72955 -17685 -82326 
Low gr wth I low ri n thinning 
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